The Influence of PCAOB Inspections on Audit Committee Members' Judgments

ABSTRACT

This paper experimentally examines whether the likelihood of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) audit engagement inspection can moderate the negative incentives created by short-term stock option compensation on audit committee members' decisions. Prior research suggests that short-term option compensation may weaken audit committee member objectivity and oversight quality (Archambeault et al. 2008; Magilke et al. 2009; Keune and Johnstone 2010); however, holding individuals accountable for their actions has been shown to result in less self-serving decisions (Rus et al. 2012). Ninety-two Executive M.B.A.s, serving the role of audit committee members, evaluate a hypothetical audit case that involves a dispute between management and the external auditors, with likelihood of PCAOB inspection and type of compensation manipulated between participants. Results...more